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INCREASING RETURNS TO SAVINGS AND WEALTH INEQUALITY 
 





In this paper I present an explanation to the fact that in the data wealth is 
substantially more concentrated than income. Starting from the observation that the 
composition of households' portfolios changes towards a larger share of high-yield 
assets as the level of net worth increases, I first use data on historical asset returns 
and portfolio composition by wealth level to construct an empirical return function. I 
then augment the standard neoclassical growth model with idiosyncratic labor 
income risk and missing insurance markets to allow for returns to savings to be 
increasing in the level of accumulated assets. The quantitative properties of the 
model are examined and show that an empirically plausible difference between the 
return faced by poor and wealthy agents is able to generate a substantial increase in 
wealth inequality compared to the basic model, enough to match the Gini index of 
the U.S. Distribution of wealth. 
 
Keywords: Wealth inequality, self-insurance, portfolio composition, increasing 
returns. 
 1 Introduction
Empirical studies like Hurst, Luoh and Staﬀord (1998), Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini and
Ríos-Rull (1997), and Budría-Rodríguez et al. (2002) have shown that earnings, income
and wealth are very concentrated, with distributions that are skewed to the right. Of
t h et h r e ev a r i a b l e sw e a l t hi sb yf a rt h em o s tc o n c e n t r a t e dw i t haG i n ic o e ﬃcient of 0.78,
while the same index for earnings and income is 0.63 and 0.57.1
The latter fact is a regularity that is observed over time and across countries as well
and has drawn considerable attention in the quantitative macroeconomic literature. The
basic framework used to explain this fact is the one in Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett
(1996) and is based on heterogeneous labor earnings shocks, missing insurance markets
and borrowing constraints. In Aiyagari’s setting agents are ex-ante identical, but at any
point in time each of them has experienced a diﬀerent history of realized labor shocks.
Inequality is generated because agents with a history of good shocks have accumulated
savings to insure themselves against the possibility of bad shocks, while agents with
a history of bad shocks have depleted their accumulated assets. Huggett adds saving
to ﬁnance consumption during retirement as a further ingredient that enhances wealth
inequality by introducing heterogeneity across agents of diﬀerent ages. Both models
are successful at reproducing qualitatively the empirical evidence. However they are
incapable of matching the data quantitatively so that various features, like heterogeneous
subjective discount factors, bequest motives a n de n t r e p r e n e u r s h i ph a v eb e e nu s e di nl a t e r
work to improve the performance of the basic model.
Both the basic model and the extensions that followed share one key assumption about
the assets available to the agents to carry out their saving plans. This assumption is that
there is a single asset in the economy. A consequence is that all agents, no matter what
their income or wealth is, face the same return on their investments. This assumption
is clearly at odds with reality, since real world households may choose to hold assets as
diverse in terms of return, risk and liquidity as for example housing and stocks or life
insurance policies and checking accounts. To the extent that portfolio composition and
returns vary systematically among households, these will have diﬀerent incentives to save
adding a further potential source of wealth inequality.
The goal of this research is to incorporate this basic feature of households’ investment
decision in an otherwise standard precautionary savings model and test whether the
existence of increasing returns to savings is a quantitative relevant source of wealth
inequality. It turns out that it is: a modest diﬀerence in the return faced by the poorest
1The values reported here are taken from Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) and are based
on the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances.
3and wealthiest households in the economy is suﬃcient to match the Gini index and the
share of the diﬀerent quintiles of the U.S. distribution of wealth. This suggests that so far
the most relevant explanation for the massive concentration of wealth of real economies
has been overlooked, explaining the diﬃculties that past models have faced in their eﬀort.
A caveat is that this paper models an inﬁnite-horizon economy. In a ﬁnite-horizon setting
it is unlikely that small diﬀerences in returns could generate huge diﬀerences in wealth
during the course of a lifetime. However an extension of the life-cycle model that adds
intergenerational links like in Castañeda, Dìaz-Giménez and Rios-Rull (2002) and De
Nardi (2001) would reproduce the results of the dynastic model considered here.
The model assumes exogenously that returns to saving are increasing in the level
of wealth; however, this feature of investment opportunities has strong support in the
data. Empirical research by Bertaut and Starr-Mcluer (2000), Kennickell et al. (2000)
and Samwick (2000) clearly shows that the composition of households’ portfolios shifts
towards larger fractions of high-yield assets, like stocks and business equity, as the house-
hold’s net worth increases. In the paper I ﬁrst construct an empirical return function
using data on portfolio composition by wealth levels reported in Samwick (2000) and
data on returns of broad categories of assets from a variety of sources. This exercise
reveals that while the poorest 60 percent of the population faces an average return to
its wealth which is close to 1 percent, the top 1 percent invests its wealth at an average
return in excess of 4.5 percent. Then, using standard values for the preference and tech-
nology parameters, I show that a diﬀerence in the return between rich and poor agents
that is consistent with the empirical evidence generates a substantial amount of extra
inequality in the basic Aiyagari model, enough to match the Gini index observed in the
U.S. economy.
The reason why a model with increasing returns to savings can match the observed
level of wealth inequality is the following. In the standard model, as discussed in Carroll
(2000), the incentive to save declines to negligible levels before the large amount of asset
holdings observed in the data is reached. In the present framework instead, agents who
receive a suﬃciently long string of good labor income realizations to accumulate a large
amount of wealth face higher returns that keep up their propensity to save, leading to
further increases of their net worth. At the same time this behavior of wealthy people
will lead to a rate of return to small amounts of assets that is further away from the
subjective discount factor than it would be in the standard case of constant returns,
leading unlucky agents to accumulate even less. The two forces jointly spread out both
ends of the wealth distribution making it more consistent with the empirical evidence.
Before moving to the remaining sections of the paper it is important to spend a few
words about the interpretation of the positive relation between net worth and portfolio
4returns that is observed in the data and, basedo nt h a te v i d e n c e ,i sa s s u m e dh e r e .T h e r e
are two alternative but not mutually exclusive stories that can be told to explain this
relation. The ﬁrst is a market imperfection one: it may be necessary to pay information
costs to gain knowledge of the functioning of some asset markets and even then other
trading costs are required to actually participate in those markets. As a consequence
only households that have accumulated enough wealth may ﬁnd it attractive to spend the
time and money needed to participate in those higher return markets. In support of this
view come a number of studies like, for example, Paiella (2001) and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2001) about the costs of participating in the stock market and by Hong, Kubik and Stein
(2001) that ﬁnd participation to the stock market being positively related to sociability
as a result of the eﬀect that communication with peers has in lowering information costs.
The second story is a behavioral one: according to this interpretation some agents
dislike some assets and decide not to participate even if this would be optimal based on
their risk preferences and on the asset return. In support of this possibility the paper
cited above by Hong et al.(2001) reports that participation in the stock market in the
U.S. is substantially higher for white than for non-white even after controlling for wealth,
income, education and survey measures of risk tolerance; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2004) reach a similar conclusion with Italian data when comparing participation rates
between southern and northern Italians.2
The model presented in this paper is more consistent with the ﬁrst interpretation since
it implies a positive feed-back from wealth accumulation to higher returns and again to
further accumulation; moreover it does not assume heterogeneity in tastes. However
it is not in contrast with the behavioral story: by showing that small diﬀerences in
the return to assets can generate a realistic concentration of wealth it says that small
ex-ante diﬀerences in behavior concerning portfolio composition may lead to the large
observed wealth inequality. Moreover the same positive relation between net worth and
the return on savings assumed in this paper would still be obtained as an ex-post result
in a behavioral one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I ﬁrst review the quantitative
literature on wealth inequality. In Section 3 I present a short account of the empirical
evidence on wealth inequality and on portfolio composition at diﬀerent wealth levels; I
then construct an empirical schedule that maps net worth into average portfolio returns.
In Section 4 I describe the model, the choice of parameters and the results. Finally
2The three authors suggest that ﬁnancial contracts and stocks in particular are trust-intensive con-
tracts. They then exploit variation within Italy of measures of social capital (of which trust is an
important element) and show that these are positively related to the use of checks, participation in the
stock market and the availability of credit.
5Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Al a r g en u m b e ro fp a p e r sp r e s e n tq u a n t i t a t i v em o d e l st h a ta t t e m p tt oe x p l a i nt h eo b -
served wealth distribution3. These models share a set of basic assumptions. First they
are populated by agents who receive an exogenous stochastic ﬂow of income. Second,
markets are assumed to be incomplete so that it is not possible to fully insure con-
sumption risk. Finally there is some form of borrowing constraints. A notable example
of this kind of models is Aiyagari (1994). Agents use accumulated savings in order to
buﬀer negative shocks to income and therefore to smooth consumption. While agents are
ex-ante homogeneous, ex-post each of them will have experienced a diﬀerent history of
past realized incomes leading to a diﬀerent level of accumulated wealth. This model, as
presented in the above mentioned paper by Aiyagari, generates a distribution of wealth
which is more concentrated than the distribution of income, a feature that is qualita-
tively consistent with the data. However at a quantitative level it grossly underpredicts
the observed concentration of wealth. In particular it fails to explain the two tails of the
distribution, that is, the very low level of wealth accumulation by poor agents and the
accumulation of huge estates at the very top of the wealth distribution.
The model in Aiyagari (1994) considers an economy populated by inﬁnitely-lived
dynasties in which saving occurs for precautionary reasons. In a related paper Huggett
(1996) uses similar assumptions about market structure, but casts the model in a ﬁnite-
h o r i z o nf r a m e w o r kw h e r ea g e n t sf a c ear e a l i s t i cl i f e t i m ep r o ﬁle of earnings and go through
the working and retirement stages of life. In this framework saving also occurs to ﬁnance
retirement consumption. The model fares well in terms of matching the Gini index but it
obtains this result by having a large fraction of households with no or even negative wealth
while still underestimating the large accumulation of assets of the very rich. Moreover
those with no wealth are entirely concentrated among very young households that face
an upward sloping earnings proﬁle and would like to borrow.
Following these two papers various mechanisms have been proposed to improve the
ability of quantitative models to match the observed concentration of wealth. These
attempts may be broadly classiﬁed based on whether their main focus is on the left or
the right tail of the distribution.
A prototypical example of the ﬁrst group is the paper by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes
(1995). Their model is cast in a ﬁnite-horizon framework. It features diﬀerent lifetime
3Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) present an excellent review of the attempts that have been made to
explain the quantitative properties of the US wealth distribution.
6proﬁles and risk of earnings for diﬀerent educational groups and adds health risk. The
crucial element is the presence of means-tested government programs that provide a safety
net in the form of a ﬂoor on consumption in case of very bad luck. This induces very
poor agents not to accumulate assets at all and rely on public social insurance instead.
While not directly focused on measuring wealth inequality this model is able to generate
a substantial number of agents with very low or no savings at all without having them
entirely concentrated among younger agents.
Another institutional feature that has the potential to reconcile the data on the uneven
wealth distribution with the output of quantitative models is the progressivity of the
social security system. This has been used by Domeij and Klein (2002) to account for
the large portion of Swedish households with very little wealth and, coupled with lifetime
diﬀerences in earning abilities, has also been proposed by Huggett and Ventura (2000)
to explain why low income households as a group save a lower fraction of their income
than high income households do.
As far as the right tail of the wealth distribution is concerned two mechanisms have
been proposed so far. Based on the empirical observation, reported in Gentry and Hub-
bard (2000), that entrepreneurs both make a signiﬁcant share of very wealthy households
and tend to have higher wealth-income-ratios, Quadrini (2000) constructs a model where
entrepreneurship is recognized as the critical element to add to a quantitative model to
generate realistic wealth concentration. In his model there are three features that drive
savings of business households up. First, imperfections in ﬁnancial markets limit the
amount that can be borrowed, forcing agents who have entrepreneurial ideas to accu-
mulate wealth to overcome that constraint. Second, intermediation costs drive a wedge
between borrowing and lending rates so that the marginal return to saving and investing
in the private ﬁrm is higher than market returns. Finally, consistent with the empirical
evidence, Quadrini assumes that the income ﬂow generated by a business is more risky
than the income of paid employees, increasing precautionary saving. While the model
is able to generate a more realistic wealth concentration and to account for the higher
wealth-income ratio and upward mobility of entrepreneurial households, it basically ne-
glects the fact that a substantial share of the top of the wealth distribution is made by
non entrepreneurial households; moreover it is silent about the left tail of the distribution.
The second mechanism exploits intergenerational links in the form of altruism and
correlation between the earning abilities of successive members of a family. Castañeda
et al. (2002) is an example along these lines: the authors use intergenerational links and
a stylized representation of the U.S. security system and estate taxation to check if it is
possible to ﬁnd a process for earnings that allows the model to match the distribution
of earnings and wealth simultaneously. While they claim their eﬀort is successful, the
7resulting labor earnings process is highly unrealistic. In a slightly diﬀerent fashion De
Nardi (2001) also constructs a model populated by ﬁnitely lived agents in which parents
and children are linked by voluntary bequests and persistence within families in earnings
abilities. Her model is calibrated on U.S. and Swedish data and shows how the two
intergenerational links are important to explain the emergence of the large estates we
observe at the top of the wealth distribution.4
Finally a completely diﬀe r e n ta p p r o a c ht h a tl o o k sj o i n t l ya tt h et w oe n d so ft h e
wealth distribution has been followed by Krusell and Smith (1998). The key feature of
their model is the assumption of heterogeneous subjective discount factors. While many
economists would look with suspicion at a model based on an unobservable variable like
the discount factor, there is some experimental evidence in favor of preference hetero-
geneity.5The economy in Krusell and Smith is populated by inﬁnitely lived agents but
retains some features of a ﬁnite-horizon model by assuming that discount factors, an in-
dividual speciﬁc characteristic, change stochastically over time with an average frequency
close to the average length of life. As a result of this assumption some agents will be
patient, accumulate wealth and therefore ﬁx the equilibrium interest rate. The rest will
have a discount factor well below the interest rate and therefore act as hand-to-mouth
c o n s u m e r s .A sar e s u l tt h em o d e li sa b l et og e n e r a t eb o t hal a r g en u m b e ro fa g e n t sw i t h
low or no assets at all and an empirically plausible concentration of wealth at the top of
the distribution.
The present work is most closely related to Quadrini (2000) and Krusell and Smith
(1998). It shares with Quadrini’s paper the idea that an important contribution to the
explanation of the high concentration of wealth that we observe in the data comes from
t h ef a c tt h a td i ﬀerent agents face diﬀerent investment opportunities and that those who
are wealthier face higher returns which in turn induces them to accumulate further. The
theory presented here is more general in many respects though. It has the merit that it
acknowledges that high returns may come from stocks as well as ownership of a private
enterprise and that empirically high returns to investment are a common feature of the
portfolio of all wealthy agents and not only of entrepreneurs. It also recognizes the role
played by the low returns faced by poor households in determining their very limited
4The two approaches are brought together by Cagetti and De Nardi (2002). First, they explicitly
model a market friction that limits entrepreneurial borrowing generating higher returns to investment in
own ﬁrms than on the market. Second, their economy is populated by stochastically aging agents who
go through the stages of working life, retirement and death, therefore allowing for voluntary bequests.
The joint operation of higher marginal returns to business investment and the bequest motive enable
their model to reproduce the high concentration of wealth at the top of the distribution, although it is
still true that the very wealthy are active or retired entrepreneurs, which leaves the empirically observed
share of wealthy non entrepreneurs unaccounted for.
5See for example Barsky et al. (1997).
8accumulation of assets
The relation with Krusell and Smith is that in both models the source of the high
concentration of wealth comes from the fact that diﬀerent agents face returns that are
at diﬀerent distance from their subjective discount factors: in Krusell and Smith there is
only one rate of return and discount factors are heterogeneous, while here there is only
one discount factor and returns are heterogeneous. The advantage of the framework here
is that heterogeneity in discount factors is not observable while the fact that returns to
portfolios are increasing in their size is an empirically well documented observation, as
it will be shown in the next section.
3 The Empirical Evidence
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, it reports some basic data about inequality
and in particular it shows the well known fact that the concentration of wealth is greater
than the concentration of income and earnings. Second, it brieﬂy describes some facts
about the observed changes in portfolio composition as we move along the wealth dis-
tribution. Here the main ﬁnding is that richer households tend to have more complex
portfolio structures with a larger fraction of their net worth held in high yielding as-
sets than poorer households. Using data on portfolio composition by level of net worth,
together with data on returns to diﬀerent assets I then compute an empirical return
s c h e d u l e . I tw i l lb es h o w nt h a tt h er a n g eo ft h i ss c h e d u l ei nn o tl a r g eb u ts t i l ln o t
negligible.
3.1 Some Facts about Inequality
There exist very good and extensive surveys on diﬀerent dimensions of inequality like
Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997), Hurst et al. (1998), Wolﬀ (2000) and Budría-Rodríguez et
al. (2002). In this subsection therefore I brieﬂy report on some aspects of inequality
in the U.S. data focussing in particular on the relative features of earnings compared to
wealth inequality.
Table 1 reports the Gini coeﬃcient and the share of net worth held by diﬀerent
quantiles of the distribution in 1992.6 The most striking feature that emerges from a
look at Table 1 is the extreme concentration of wealth at the top of the distribution. The
6T h et a b l ei sb a s e do nW o l ﬀ (2000) who in turn used the Survey of Consumer Finances as the source
of data. The SCF is a survey sponsored by the Federal Reserve and the Department of the Treasury and
is conducted every three years on a randomly selected sample of households. Its main feature is that it
oversamples very wealthy households and therefore it is the most reliable source of data to study the
ﬁnancial choices of the very rich.
9Table 1: Wealth Inequality (data)
Year Gini coeﬃcient Top 1 % Top 5% Top 20% Bottom 40%
Percentage share of wealth by quantile
1983 0.779 32.6 54.4 79.6 1.7
1992 0.802 35.9 58.3 81.9 1.2
Table 2: Income Inequality (data)
Year Gini coeﬃcient Top 1 % Top 5% Top 20% Bottom 40%
Percentage share of income by quantile
1982 0.480 12.8 26.1 52.0 12.3
1991 0.528 15.7 30.5 56.3 10.5
one percent richest households owned, in 1992, 35.9 percent of total national wealth of
the U.S. economy and if we look at a slightly broader set of families, that is, the top 5
percent, the share in total net worth increases to 58.3 percent. The second important
fact is the negligible amount of wealth held by a large fraction of the population; the
40 percent poorest families owned in 1992 only 1.2 percent of total net worth. Looking
at the two rows of the table it is clear that the large degree of wealth concentration is
a quite stable feature of the U.S. economy, as the share of total net worth at diﬀerent
quantiles of the distribution did not move much between 1983 and 1992.
Table 2 reports the same statistics as Table 1, but refers to the distribution of income.
While income is still very concentrated it is considerably less concentrated than wealth.
The Gini index is now only 0.480 in 1982 and 0.528 in 1991. The share of the top 1
percent in 1991 was 15.7 percent and that of the top 5 percent was 30.5 percent in the
same year. Finally the 40 percent poorest in the population earned a little more than
10% of total income, a small but not completely negligible share.7
3.2 Wealth and Portfolio Composition
In this subsection I report some statistics that illustrate how the composition of household
portfolios change with the level of net worth. There are some good surveys on the topic
like Bertaut and Starr-Mcluer (2000), Kennickell et al. (2000) and Samwick (2000). The
main messages that consistently emerge from all of them are that the structure of family
portfolios increases in complexity as their wealth increases and that wealthier households
7Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997) and Budría Rodríguez et al. (2002) report also statistics about the
concentration of earnings. These are similar to the ones for income and therefore are not reported here.
10Table 3: Ownership of Selected Assets by Wealth Quintiles
Assets: 0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 top 5
Liquid accounts 74.1 95.6 99.2 100.0 100.0
Stocks 3.8 10.7 20.0 47.3 72.8
Mutual funds 2.2 10.2 17.2 40.8 53.3
Business equity 2.1 7.5 11.5 28.1 62.9
Table 4: Share of Selected Assets by Wealth Quintiles
Assets: 0-40 80-90 90-95 95-99 top 1
Liquid accounts 13.7 16.2 12.4 9.0 6.6
Stocks 12.6 17.8 21.8 26.2 19.4
Business equity 3.9 8.5 11.0 16.4 40.2
invest larger shares of their net worth in higher-return and higher-risk assets. As far as
the ﬁrst point is concerned, Bertaut and Starr-Mcluer (2000) classify households based on
the number of diﬀerent types of assets they hold in their portfolios. Then they compute
the median value of ﬁnancial wealth for the groups obtained in this way and ﬁnd that
there is a monotonically increasing relationship between the two variables.
More relevant to the purpose of the present paper is the second point which I will
illustrate by means of Table 3 and Table 4. In Table 3 I report the percentage of house-
holds who own the particular asset indicated in the ﬁrst column of the table.8 The ﬁgures
are reported by wealth quartiles and separately for the wealthiest 5 percent families. It
is clear that liquid accounts, a group of assets that pay a very low return, are very
widespread even among the bottom quartile of the distribution and their use is basically
universal from the next quartile up. On the contrary high yielding assets like stocks,
mutual funds and business assets, are held by about 2 to 4 percent of the families in
the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution, a very tiny minority. The fraction of
households owning those assets increases monotonically as we move to upper quartiles of
the distribution so that each of them is owned by more than half of the 5 percent richest
families.
While Table 3 reports data on participation to diﬀerent asset markets, Table 4 takes
an alternative perspective and looks at the share that assets with diﬀerent returns rep-
resent in the average portfolios of families belonging to diﬀerent quantiles of the wealth
distribution.9 The reported shares are relative to wealth net of the value of owner oc-
8The table is an excerpt from Table 4, pp 29, in Bertaut and Starr-Mcluer (2000).
9This table is based on Table 9.3 and Table 9.4 in Samwick, (2000). The tables report data for 1983,
11cupied house. Liquid accounts make 13.7 percent of the average portfolio of households
in the bottom 40 percent of the wealth distribution. This percentage goes up to 16.2
at the second decile and then declines monotonically to a low 6.6 for the top percentile.
The share of business equity in total assets shows a monotonic increase across the whole
distribution, starting from a low 3.9 percent for the bottom 40 percent and increasing to
a high 40.2 percent for the top percentile. The fraction of directly and indirectly held
stocks shows a non monotonic pattern. Stocks represent 12.6 percent of the portfolio of
the average household in the bottom 40 percent of the wealth distribution, 26.2 percent
when we consider households in the 95th to 99th percentile and then a slightly lower 19.4
for the top percentile. However both stocks and business equity are high yielding assets
and if the two are summed the fraction of this sum in total non housing wealth shows a
clear pattern of monotonic increase across all the wealth distribution.
Summarizing, Table 4 clearly shows that as wealth increases the share of high-yielding
assets increases and that of low-yielding assets decreases, so that households face a return
schedule that is increasing in their asset holdings. This statement will be made more
precise in the next section where an empirical return schedule is constructed.
3.3 Portfolio Returns
In this section I take the available evidence on portfolio composition by percentiles of the
wealth distribution described in the previous section and using data about the return to
diﬀerent categories of assets I construct an empirical function that maps wealth holdings
into returns on that wealth.
Samwick (2000) reports the composition of the portfolio of the average household be-
longing to diﬀerent percentiles of the wealth distribution, classifying assets into the fol-
lowing groups: ﬁnancial, own home, other properties, private equity and a miscellaneous
entry that includes all other assets that do not fall in any of the previous categories.
In turn he breaks down ﬁnancial assets into interest bearing accounts, taxable bonds
and equity, reporting a separate ﬁgure for the share held through retirement accounts,
tax-exempt bonds and a residual group which includes, among else, cash value of life
insurance policies and trust accounts. He also reports, for the same percentiles of the
wealth distribution, the net worth of the average household in that percentile. The data
are constructed based on the 1983, 1989, 1992 and 1995 issues of the Survey of Consumer
Finances.
In order to construct an empirical return function I proceed as follows. First I elim-
1989, 1992 and 1995. The ones reported here refer to the year 1995. Results for the other years are very
similiar and therefore they are not reported.
12inate from the computation the assets in the residual categories, since it is diﬃcult to
impute a measure of their return. Overall they represent about 10 percent of total assets
in the four surveys; when we look through the wealth distribution this share is slightly
b e l o w1 0p e r c e n ta tt h et o pa n da b o u t2 0p e r c e n ta tt h eb o t t o mo ft h ew e a l t hd i s t r i b u -
tion.10 Next I collect the share of stocks held directly or in retirement accounts and do
t h es a m ef o rb o n d sa d d i n gi nt h i sc a s ea l s ot a x - e x e m p tb o n d s . F i n a l l yIc o n s i d e ro w n
house and other property as a single asset, even though the latter may include land and
other non-residential properties. By doing this regrouping I end up splitting net worth
into ﬁve classes: interest-bearing accounts, stocks, bonds, property and business assets.
Interest-bearing accounts are a heterogeneous group of assets that includes checking
and saving accounts, which pay a negative real interest, and certiﬁcates of deposit and
money market accounts, which pay a small positive interest; therefore, I conventionally
set the return to this category to 0.
I set the return to stocks to 8 percent, the value reported in Jagannathan et al. (2000)
for the return to the S&P 500 index for the period 1926 to 1999. Based on Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jørgensen’s (2002) claim that the return to private equity is no diﬀerent than
the return to the public equity index I also set the return to business assets at 8 percent.
As far as bonds are concerned, these are again a heterogeneous category of assets
including government, corporate and foreign bonds as well as municipal and state bonds
that have a preferential tax treatment. Not having a ﬁner subdivision of the category I
attribute to it the return to 20-year U.S. Treasury securities of 1.9 percent reported in
Jagannathan et al. (2000) and referring again to the period 1926-1999.
Finally, Goetzmann and Spiegel (2000) report that according to the Oﬃce of Housing
Enterprise Oversight the real price of housing has increased at a 0.5 percent annual
compounded rate over the period 1980 to 2000. While the return to residential property
includes the housing services that it provides, this class of assets has special costs like
property taxes and maintenance. Moreover high costs and risks of transaction may have
a strong negative impact on the return, especially when the holding period is short. The
two authors then suggest that the return to this asset may be even lower than the 0.5
percent per year that their price appreciation suggests. Given all these considerations I
take the value of 0.5 percent as the return to property.
With this in mind I can construct a return to the average portfolio of diﬀerent per-
10Most of this share and its variation across wealth groups comes from the category miscellaneous
non-ﬁnancial assets. This could be a consequence of the inclusion of cars and other motor vehicles in
the category. These assets are durable goods that have a consumption value but - as it is clear in the
case of cars - they pay a negative return. Including them in the computation of portfolio returns would
further increase the diﬀerence in the returns faced by poor and wealthy agents.
13Table 5: Return by Wealth Percentiles
Percentiles 0-60 60-80 80-90 90-95 95-99 99-00 all
1983
a 0 . 1 3 0 . 6 71 . 3 02 . 4 15 . 7 03 0 . 7 1 1
R(a) 0.95 1.14 1.67 2.61 3.54 4.87 3.02
1989
a 0.11 0.69 1.33 2.34 5.3 33.4 1
R(a) 0.87 1.22 1.56 2.07 2.94 4.05 2.63
1992
a 0 . 1 2 0 . 6 81 . 3 72 . 5 15 . 8 62 9 . 2 9 1
R(a) 0.93 1.39 1.88 2.29 3.22 4.41 2.77
1995
a 0 . 1 1 0 . 6 31 . 2 42 . 3 65 . 3 13 4 . 8 3 1
R(a) 1.13 1.50 1.83 2.50 3.42 5.09 3.05
Note: a: Average percentile wealth normalized by average wealth
R(a): Percentage return to average portfolio by percentile
centiles of the wealth distribution for the four years considered by Samwick; the results
are reported in Table 5. The level of wealth in the table is normalized by the value of
average net worth for that particular year. There are two points that are worth noting
in the table. First, in all the years considered, the average return that households face
on their portfolio is monotonically increasing in the level of net worth. The second point
concerns the magnitude of the diﬀerence between the return faced at the top and at the
bottom of the distribution. In 1983 the average household in the top 1 percent of the
population held 30.7 times the average net worth and faced a return on its assets of 4.87
percent, while the average return faced by a household in the bottom 60 percent of the
distribution, which held only 0.13 times the average wealth in the population, was 0.95
percent, corresponding to a diﬀerence of 3.92 percentage points. Looking at the other
years the diﬀerence between the return faced by poorest and wealthiest households was
3.18 percentage points in 1989, 3.48 percentage points in 1995 and 3.96 percentage points
in 1995. Overall it seems that the diﬀerence is not big but still signiﬁcant and can be
bounded between 3 and 4 percentage points.
It will be the focus of the modelling section to see to what extent a diﬀerence in
returns of this magnitude can be held responsible for the extreme concentration of wealth,
compared to the one of earnings, that we observe in the data.
144 The Model
The model in this paper builds on the standard stochastic growth model. Agents are ex-
ante identical; however, they receive a stochastic endowment of eﬃciency units of labor
which can be only partially insured by saving. This introduces ex-post heterogeneity like
in Aiyagari (1994). The model features a second source of ex-post heterogeneity in the
form of diﬀerences in the return to assets that are related to their level.
4.1 The Economic Environment
The economy is populated by a large (measure one) number of inﬁnitely lived agents






where β is the subjective discount factor and the period utility function U is of the




where c is period consumption and γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
In each period agents receive a stochastic endowment of eﬃciency units of labor which
Id e n o t ew i t hl. The logarithmh l o ft h ee n d o w m e n te v o l v e so v e rt i m ef o l l o w i n gaﬁrst-order
autoregressive process
h lt = ρh lt−1 + εt
where εt is iid over time and normally distributed.
Agents have a single asset to carry out their saving plans; the amount of the asset
held at time t is denoted by at and a tight borrowing constraint, at ≥ 0 is assumed.
The crucial and distinctive assumption in the model is that the return to this asset is
increasing in the amount held by the agent. We can pictorially visualize this assumption
by thinking that production takes place in a single factory while consumption is carried
out at decentralized locations where agents live. Agents receive the compensation for
labor services at the factory and carry it with them at no cost to their living quarters.
They are also entitled to capital income in an amount which is the product of their asset
15holdings and the marginal product of capital, but this is shipped to their location and
during transportation part of this output is lost, with the amount lost growing less than
proportionally with the amount to be delivered.
The assumption of a return function which is increasing in the level of assets is a
reduced form to capture the evidence, presented in the previous section, that house-
holds invest larger proportions of their portfolios in higher-yield assets as they become
wealthier.11
Iw i l ld e n o t ew i t hR the price of the services of capital that in a competitive equi-
librium will be equal to the marginal product of capital; I will use the notation r(a) to
refer to the function that describes the actual compensation received by agents who own
capital. This function can then be written as:
r(a)=1+h I (a)
and
h I (a)=R − I (a).




Here ν, a,a n dλ are three constants which control the diﬀerence in returns faced by
the poorest and wealthiest households, the level of wealth at which the returns start to
pick up and the speed of this increase respectively.
At the aggregate level capital and labor are turned into output of the single good Y
according to the usual Cobb-Douglass technology: Y = KαL1−α where K and L denote
aggregate capital and labor respectively. Finally the single output good is transformed
into current consumption and future capital according to:
C + K
  = Y +( 1− δ)K − TW
11An alternative way of modelling that is more directly linked to the actual portfolio choice of house-
holds, but that is equivalent in practical terms to the one chosen here, would have been to assume that
there are two assets with diﬀerent returns and an exogenous rule that assigns weights to the two assets
with the share of the higher yield one being increasing in wealth.
16where δ is the depreciation rate, K  is next period capital and TW i st h et o t a lw a s t eo f
output that occurs when shipping capital income to the households entitled to it. If we
denote with µ(a,l) the measure of agents with asset holdings a and labor eﬃciency units







With the description of the economic environment in mind and omitting the time
index we can formulate the optimal decision problem in recursive form as follows:
V (a,l)=m a x
c,a {U (c)+βE [V (a
 ,l
 )|l]}
subject to the following set of constraints:
c + a
  = ar(a)+wl
a
  ≥ 0,c ≥ 0
where w is the wage rate and a prime denotes next period variables.
The solution to the Bellman equation described above gives rise to an optimal value
function V ∗ (a,l) and associated decision rule g(a,l).
A stationary competitive equilibrium for this economy is a value function V ∗ (a,l)
and decision rule g(a,l), a probability distribution µ∗ (a,l) and positive real numbers
(R,w) such that:
a) Given prices R and w, g(a,l) solves the household’s optimization problem with
value function V ∗ (a,l).




c) The probability distribution µ∗ (a,l) is a stationary distribution associated with
[g(a,l),P] where P is the transition probability over labor eﬃciency units. The station-












d) Markets clear, that is, C + K  = KαL1−α +( 1− δ)K − TW.
The model has no closed-form solutions and therefore it is solved numerically.
174.2 Calibration
In this section the values chosen for the parameters of the model will be described. Given
the choice of the basic parameters deﬁning preferences, technology and the stochastic la-
bor income process, the model is ﬁrst solved for a constant rate of return to assets, that
i s ,f o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hr(a)=1+R. Then a comparative analysis with diﬀerent triples
(ν,λ,a) is made in order to explore whether the assumption of increasing returns to sav-
ings can give a quantitatively relevant contribution to the explanation of the empirically
observed wealth concentration.
The values of the calibration exercise are taken from Aiyagari (1994). Preferences are
deﬁned by two parameters, that is, the subjective discount factor β and the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion γ. Consistent with a model period of one year β is set at 0.96, a
value used in most macroeconomic studies. The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ is
ﬁxed at a value of 3, in line with most studies as well.
Production technology is also deﬁned by two parameters, the share of capital in the
production function α and the depreciation rate of physical capital δ, which are assigned
t h ev a l u e so f0 . 3 6a n d0 . 0 8r e s p e c t i v e l y .
At the aggregate level the total amount of eﬃciency units of labor is normalized to
one. At the individual level the labor endowment follows an AR(1) process in logarithms,




In this section I will present the main results of the model. The section is divided in
two parts: the ﬁrst one is devoted to illustrate individual behavior as suggested by an
examination of the decision rules from the consumer’s optimization problem, the second
one considers the general equilibrium results with a focus on the wealth distribution.
4.3.1 Value and Policy Functions
Both the value function and the decision rules associated with this problem diﬀer qual-
itatively from the corresponding solutions to a standard problem with constant rate of
return.
A look at the individual optimization problem reveals that with a non-concave return
function, like the logistic one that has been assumed, the problem itself ceases to be
concave. This can, at least potentially, lead to non monotonicities in the optimal value
12The two values imply a standard of the innovation σε equal to 0.195.
18function. Whether this will be the case depends on the amount of non concavity in the
return function and is an issue that can be solved through the numerical analysis of the
problem. The numerical methods used to solve the optimization problem however do not
require concavity.13
Figure 1 reports the value function computed for the following choice of parameters
of the return function: ν is set at 0.04, a equals 4 and λ equals 1. The three lines
correspond to three diﬀerent levels of the individual endowment of labor eﬃciency units
and are plotted at the equilibrium of that particular economy. As can be seen from the
graph, the value function is still increasing but it shows a slight non-concavity around the
value of 5, that is, slightly to the right of the point where the return function with the
given parameters exhibits an inﬂection point. The non concavity however is minor and
the value functions still retain quasi concavity. The analogous plots for diﬀerent choices
of the parameters that characterize the return functions are omitted since they show the
same qualitative pattern.
As far as the decision rules are concerned it is useful to ﬁrst write down the ﬁrst-order
conditions for the optimal choice of assets. At an interior point this will read:
u







where for notational simplicity we can deﬁne the marginal return to savings as:
mrs(a)=r(a)+ar
  (a).
If we consider a given value of the marginal product of capital R, given the speciﬁ-
cation of r(a) u s e dh e r e ,i ti sa l w a y st r u et h a tt h eﬁrst term in mrs(a) is smaller than
1+R itself. However a logistic return function also implies that r  (.) is positive, so that
it cannot be said a priori whether mrs(.) i sg r e a t e ro rs m a l l e rt h a n1+R.
Figure 2 shows rates of returns to savings at the equilibrium of the model with the
same choice of parameters considered above. Two curves are plotted. The dashed line
is the return function r(a) while the continuous line is the marginal return to savings
function mrs(a). The most striking feature of the two functions is that while r(a)
converges to 1+ R, but is always below it, the marginal return to savings function
(almost) coincides with r(a) for low or high values of the level of assets, but it is above
it in an intermediate range where the return function shows a marked increase: this is
13At each state-space point the static maximization problem deﬁned by the right-hand side of the
B e l l m a nE q u a t i o ni ss o l v e dw i t had i r e c ts e a r c hm e t h o d . T h i sm e t h o di ss l o w ,b u tﬁnds the global
maximum independently of the shape of the maximand.
19Figure 1: Value Function


















Figure 2: Return Functions






























20the eﬀect of the term ar  (a). What emerges from the ﬁgure is that mrs(.) can exceed
the marginal product of capital for the corresponding parametrization of the model and
in a narrower range of wealth it can also exceed the subjective rate of intertemporal
preference.
From a qualitative point of view this is very important, since as we can see from the
ﬁrst order condition, the marginal return to savings is crucial in determining the rate of
growth of consumption and therefore the saving rate. When mrs(a) > 1+R, the Euler
equation implies a lower u  (c )/u  (c) ratio and therefore, with concave utility function, a
higher rate of growth of consumption, that is, a higher saving rate; the opposite happens
when mrs(a) < 1+R.
This can be seen in Figure 3. The graph reports the policy function at equilibrium
for the same parametrization of the economy previously used in this section. It does so
for the median value of the labor eﬃciency unit shock. It also reports the corresponding
policy function for a model that uses the same preference and technology parameters,
but adopts the conventional assumption of constant return to saving.
The decision rule for the model with non-constant returns, represented by the dashed
line, is clearly non linear and as suggested by the joint examination of the ﬁrst-order
conditions and the marginal return to savings function, it is below the decision rule for
the constant return case for low levels of wealth, where the marginal return to savings
function lies below the marginal product of capital. Around the point where marginal
returns overtake the marginal product of capital the decision rule for the non-constant
c a s eb e c o m e sh i g h e rt h a nt h eo n ef o rt h ec o n s t a n tc a s ea n dt h e nc o n v e r g e st oi tf o re v e n
higher levels of wealth.
This pattern suggests that the model with increasing returns to savings has the po-
tential to explain the observed high level of wealth concentration. This is because at low
levels of wealth agents want to dissave at a faster pace than in the constant return case,
possibly clustering around zero asset holdings. Having reached a certain critical level of
wealth however they want to save more than in the constant return case, moving upwards
more quickly. The overall eﬀe c ti st om a g n i f yt h ed i ﬀerence in asset holdings of agents
with diﬀerent histories of labor shocks. How important is this eﬀect is a quantitative issue
and will be examined for a number of diﬀerent parametrizations of the return function
in the next section.
4.3.2 General Equilibrium Results: The Preferred Parametrization
In this section I give a detailed account of the general equilibrium results for a particular
choice of the parameters of the return function and I compare them with the constant
21Figure 3: Decision Rules

































22Table 6: Wealth Inequality (Model and Data)
Gini Top 1 % Top 5% Top 10% Top 20% Bottom 40%
Percentage share of wealth by percentiles
1983 0.779 32.6 54.4 66.4 79.5 1.7
1992 0.802 35.9 58.3 69.9 82 1.2
R 0.474 4.4 17.1 29.5 48.7 9.6
R(a) 0.801 9.7 41.2 72.2 87.6 0.8
interest rate case and with the actual data from the U.S. economy. For ease of reference
Iw i l ll a b e lt h ec a s ed e t a i l e di nt h i ss e c t i o nt h ep r e f e r r e dp a r a m e t r i z a t i o n .
In the case considered here ν is given the value 0.03, λ is set at 0.125 and,a is ﬁxed
at 12. The corresponding return and marginal return functions are plotted in ﬁgure 4
and they show the same qualitative pattern as the ones described in the previous section.
Notice that the diﬀerence in the return faced by the very wealthy and the poorest agents
in the economy is only about 2.3 percentage points, a value that is consistent with the
ﬁndings reported in section 3.3.
Figure 5 plots the Lorenz curve for the preferred parametrization and for the baseline
case of constant interest rate, while Table 6 reports statistics about the wealth distri-
bution in the models and in the data. It is apparent from a look at Figure 5 that the
small diﬀerence in returns faced by agents with diﬀerent levels of assets is enough to
generate a substantial amount of extra wealth inequality compared to the one implied
by precautionary saving alone.
Table 6 makes this point clearer. The Gini index for wealth in the model with constant
interest rate is 0.474 while the one of the model with increasing returns is 0.801. This
value exactly matches the one computed for the U.S. economy based on the 1992 Survey
of Consumer Finances and overpredicts the one for the year 1983. A closer look at the
wealth distribution reveals that the share held by the 1 percent wealthiest portion of
the population is about 35 percent in the data, it is a puny 4.4 percent in the baseline
model and it is still only 9.7 percent in the preferred parametrization. Despite this
failure at the very top of the wealth distribution, the preferred parametrization fares
very well in the next percentiles. The share of the top 5 percent is 41.2 percent and the
top 10 and 20 percent hold respectively 72.2 and 87.6 percent of assets in the preferred
parametrization. The ﬁgures for the U.S. economy at the same percentiles are about
55, 69 and 80 percent respectively. The model’s output is then very close to real world
data and actually overpredicts the share of the top 10 and 20 percent of the population.
F i n a l l yi td o e sav e r yg o o dj o ba tm a t c h i n gt h ee x t r e m e l yl o ws h a r eo ft h e4 0p e r c e n t
23Figure 4: Return Functions (Preferred Parametrization)




























24poorest agents in the economy, with a model share of 0.8 percent, the same order of
magnitude of the one observed for the U.S. economy. To assess the performance of the
preferred parametrization it is also useful to point out that the baseline model with
constant interest rate grossly underpredicts the share of all the top percentiles of the
distribution while it generates a 9.6 percent ﬁgure for the bottom 40 percent, largely
above the 1.2 or 1.7 percent observed in the data.
A look at the distribution of wealth, reported in Figure 6 helps understand the me-
chanics of the model. The ﬁgure reports the distribution fort h eb a s e l i n ec a s eo fc o n s t a n t
returns and for the current choice of parameters. Clearly the preferred model is better
able at approximating the Pareto shape of the wealth distribution that we observe in
the data14, with a large number of agents piled up at or very close to the borrowing
constraint and a very elongated right tail.
A peculiar feature of the distribution generated by the model with increasing returns
and not observed in the data, is that there are very few agents in an intermediate range
of wealth, between 10 and 30, and then a larger group at the right of this interval. This
second feature of the distribution can be interpreted by looking at the plot of the marginal
return function and observing that it exhibits a spike at an asset level slightly greater than
2 0 ,w h e r et h er e t u r ni sa b o v et h es u b j e c t i v ed i s c o u n tr a t e ,a n di ss u b s t a n t i a l l yb e l o wt h a t
at low levels of wealth. Agents who get to accumulate enough wealth for precautionary
reasons will then start to accumulate assets very fast and pile up at a higher wealth level,
where the marginal return to savings converges to the lower marginal product of capital.
A sac o n s e q u e n c ef e wa g e n t sa ta n yp o i n ti nt i m ew i l lh o l da na m o u n to fa s s e t si nt h e
region where rapid accumulation takes place. This also contributes to explaining why
the perfect match of the Gini index is obtained by underestimating the share of the top 1
and 5 percent of the population and overestimating the one of the top 10 and 20 percent:
within the group of lucky agents a little more inequality would be needed for a perfect
match.15 For the parameters used convergence occurs around a level of assets of 50, that
is about 9 times the average stock of capital, resulting in a wealth-income ratio for the
top 1 percent of 7.3, still below the one in the data which is around 12, although much
larger than the 4.06 of the constant return model.
The large number of agents with very little or no wealth at all is explained instead
by the fact that those who get bad draws of the labor eﬃciency shock and therefore are
14See Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) for a plot of the wealth distribution in the US data.
15This feature is a consequence of the functional form of the return function and not of the particular
parameters chosen, as it will become more clear in the next section when a sensitivity analysis will be
performed. A possible way out is to assume that diﬀerent groups of the population face diﬀerent return
schedules so that the asset level where rapid accumulation occurs is diﬀerent for diﬀerent agents.
25Figure 5: Lorenz Curves (Fixed Return and Preferred Case)














26forced to decumulate, will at some point do this much faster than in the constant return
case because the rate of return that they face is well below their subjective discount rate,
much more than it would be in the constant return case. This latter fact can be better
appreciated by also looking at aggregate results. The equilibrium interest rate for the
model with constant returns is 3.36 percent and by deﬁnition is the return faced by every
agent in the economy; the return faced by poor agents in the preferred parametrization
is instead only 1.12 percent.
Summarizing, the preferred parametrization shows that the hypothesis of increasing
returns to savings is a powerful mechanism for matching the observed concentration of
wealth quantitatively. It is worth stressing that this is a consequence not of the impact it
has on the wealth distribution per se, but of the fact that this impact is obtained with a
small diﬀerence in the returns faced by wealth-poor and wealth-rich agents, a diﬀerence
which in the model is about 2.5 percentage points, perfectly consistent with the empirical
evidence. As a further support to the virtues of this model, if one interprets the amount
of output lost in the model economy as cost of intermediation and compares the ﬁgure
to the value added of the ﬁnancial sector, which performs this intermediation role in
actual economies, it turns out that the share for the model is 1.9 percent, the same order
of magnitude of the ﬁgure for the U.S. economy of 4.02, reported in Díaz-Giménez et
al.(1992).16
Once again it should be stressed that the goal of this paper is to show how a simple
and empirically well documented fact, so far largely overlooked, is responsible for the
largest part of the observed wealth concentration. This should be kept in mind when
assessing the fact that the model underestimates the share of wealth held by the top
1 percent of the population. One should take into account both that the existence of
increasing returns to savings is the only mechanism to generate wealth inequality in the
model and above all that the earnings process used here is very simpliﬁed and very far
from even approaching the observed earnings inequality. The associated Gini index is
0.049 and the share of the top 5 percent in total earnings is 5.97 percent compared to
0.46 and 19 percent in the U.S. data.
16Díaz-Giménez et al. (1992) report data on the fraction of the ﬁnancial sector in total output for
selected years in the US. That sector accounted for 2.7 percent of output in 1950 and has steadily grown
to reach 5.6 percent at the end of the 80s. The ﬁgure reported in the main text is the average of those
reported in the cited paper. The ﬁgures reported above and the ones in the model are of the same order
of magnitude.
27Figure 6: Wealth Distribution (Fixed Return and Preferred Case)



































28Table 7: Wealth Distribution, a=12
P e r c e n t i l e s T o p 1T o p 5T o p 1 0T o p 2 0B o t t o m 4 0G i n i i n d e x
R 4.4 17.1 29.5 48.7 9.6 0.474
R(a):
λ =0 .125
ν =0 .03 9.7 41.2 72.2 87.6 0.8 0.801
ν =0 .04 9.9 42.3 75.8 93.1 0.3 0.835
λ =0 .25
ν =0 .03 6.6 27.9 50.8 87.4 0.5 0.761
ν =0 .04 7.3 30.7 55.6 93.1 0.2 0.794
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section results for other choices of the parameters that deﬁne the return function
are presented. The analysis is less detailed than the one in the previous section for the
preferred parametrization and is conﬁn e dt oa ne x a m i n a t i o no ft h ew e a l t hc o n c e n t r a t i o n
statistics. The choice of the parameters is the following. I consider two diﬀerent values
of a, the inﬂection point of the return function, namely a =8and a =1 2 . Then, based
on the fact reported in section 3.3, that the range of the empirical return schedule is
between a little more than 3 percent and a little less than 4 percent I choose to run the
simulations for values of the parameter ν of 0.03 and 0.04.17 Finally I consider two values
of λ, the parameter that controls the steepness of the return function, namely λ =0 .125
and λ =0 .25.
The results are reported in Table 7 and Table 8.The ﬁr s tf a c tt h a te m e r g e sf r o mt h e
tables is that the Gini coeﬃcient ranges from a lowest 0.714 to a highest 0.835. Looking
back at Table 1, the index for the U.S. economy was 0.779 in 1983 and 0.802 in 1992.
Clearly the ability of the increasing return to savings function to generate a level of
wealth concentration that is in line with the empirical evidence is a robust feature of the
model considered here.
Looking at the share of diﬀerent percentiles of the distribution it appears that the top
1 percent, oscillating between 6 percent and 9.9 percent is always below the corresponding
ﬁgure of about 35 percent for the U.S. economy and also the share of the top 5 percent
in the model, ranging between 24.9 percent and 42.3 percent is somewhat below the 55
17This choice implies that the range of the return function r(a) over the entire real line is an interval
of length 0.04 or 0.03. In practice however, given the choice of the other parameters, the function gets
very close to the lower asymptote only for negative values of assets. Given the tight borrowing constraint
of 0 this implies that the actual observed range of the return function in the model is somewhat below
t h eo n ei nt h ed a t a .
29Table 8: Wealth Distribution, a=8
P e r c e n t i l e s T o p 1T o p 5T o p 1 0T o p 2 0B o t t o m 4 0G i n i i n d e x
R 4.4 17.1 29.5 48.7 9.6 0.474
R(a):
λ =0 .125
ν =0 .03 8.2 34.3 60.0 82.9 1.2 0.757
ν =0 .04 8.5 36.3 65.1 89.7 0.5 0.801
λ =0 .25
ν =0 .03 6.0 24.9 44.7 76.0 0.9 0.714
ν =0 .04 6.3 26.7 48.3 82.8 0.3 0.753
percent ﬁgure found in the data. However the share held by the top 20 percent of the
model population varies between 76 percent and 93.1 percent, values that are situated
around the 81.9 percent share observed in the U.S. economy in 1992. The share of the
b o t t o m4 0p e r c e n ti nt h em o d e li so n c ea g a i nv e r yc l o s et ot h eo n eo fd a t a ,r a n g i n gf r o m
0.3 to 1.2 percent to be compared to the 1.2 percent observed in the U.S. economy.
Another important feature of the results of the sensitivity analysis is that if we ﬁx
the value of ν and a then results both in terms of the Gini coeﬃcient and in term of the
share of wealth held by the top 5 percent of the population improve substantially when
λ is reduced from 0.25 to 0.125. The interpretation of these results is straightforward.
The marginal return displays a spike at some level of assets slightly to the right of a.
This spike marks a watershed in that those agents holding an amount of wealth below
this level will face very low returns and accumulate almost no wealth at all. Once the
critical level of wealth is reached agents will tend to accumulate very quickly until the
marginal return to savings settles down to its asymptotic value. If λ is relatively high
then this convergence occurs very quickly so that a large number of agents will cluster in
a relatively small interval of wealth holdings: the share of wealth of the lucky agents who
reached the critical level of assets will be high compared to the rest of the population,
but within this group the distribution will be fairly egalitarian. When λ is reduced the
marginal return function will converge more slowly maintaining the incentive to save at
even higher level of assets; this creates more inequality also within the lucky part of the
population and increase the share of a tiny minority even more.
Finally, an increase in the diﬀerence between the lowest and highest returns, keeping
the other parameters ﬁxed leads, as expected, to an increase in wealth inequality.
305C o n c l u s i o n s
The economic fortunes of the households in real economies are very unequal with wealth
being substantially more concentrated than other measures like income and earnings.
This fact has attracted a lot of attention among macroeconomists. The basic framework
of precautionary saving outlined in Aiyagari has proven capable of reproducing the fact
reported above qualitatively, but not quantitatively leading to successive extensions that
include diﬀerent features, like social security, intergenerational links, entrepreneurship or
heterogeneous preferences but retain the basic assumption that a single asset is available
in the economy. This paper explicitly acknowledges the fact that in reality there is a
menu of assets with diﬀerent returns that households may use to carry out their saving
plans and that there is a systematic positive relationship between asset holdings and the
return to these holdings.
To accomplish this task I have considered a variant of Aiyagari’s (1994) model where
I assume that agents face a return to their savings that is increasing in the level of assets
they hold. This feature is able to increase substantially the level of wealth inequality
compared to the standard case of constant returns. As a matter of fact the model is able
to match the concentration of wealth observed in the U.S. data as measured by the Gini
index and by most quintiles of the distribution. The model still fails to match the huge
fortunes that are accumulated by a few wealthy households at the very top (1 percent)
of the distribution. This is hardly surprising though, given the fact that the stochastic
process for the eﬃciency units of labor used here is very simpliﬁed and generates an
earnings concentration that falls short of the one in the data by a large amount.
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